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Every day convicted murderers, rapists, and other violent
offenders are released by the prisons into the community.
Most have not even completed their sentences, as they
earned remittances for good behaviour. No one seems to
worry that statistically many of these former prisoners remain
dangerous, and will probably harm others sometime in the
future.1 In fact, there are criminologists who argue
persuasively that fewer offenders should be imprisoned, for
the good of their families and communities. This may reflect
the confusion about what the actual purpose of imprisonment
is, ranging from urges for retribution to achieving
rehabilitation. Nevertheless, we are satisfied that when an
offender ‘has repaid his debt to society’ he is free to re-enter
ordinary life, albeit for a while under the sometimes wavering,
watchful supervision of a parole officer. 
In contrast, as directed by sections 77 and 78 of the
Criminal Procedure Act, if an accused by reason of ‘mental
illness or mental defect’ (which is not defined) is unable to
understand court proceedings, or to have committed (or
omitted) an act during which he/she was incapable of
appreciating the wrongfulness of the act, or of acting in
accordance with such an appreciation the court will generally
certify the accused as a ‘state patient’a1, who will then be
admitted to a designated psychiatric hospital for an indefinite
period. Discharge can only be granted by a judge in
chambers, who usually endorses the conditions
recommended by the treating clinicians, for a designated
period. 
Unlike in usual court proceedings, where an accused can
only be found guilty if his guilt is proven ‘beyond reasonable
doubt’, the mentally ill offender will be certified if ‘it can be
proved on a balance of probabilities that, on the limited
evidence available the accused committed the act in
question’ (section 77(6)). This has been a recent addition to
the process, as previously such an accused would be found
not guilty by reason of insanity but committed to a psychiatric
hospital. It is not clear whether nowadays this rudimentary
determination of guilt still results in a ‘not guilty’ finding, or if
it is a weaker version of a ‘guilty but insane’ verdict. But the
use of a balance of probabilities using limited evidence does
not prima facie seem like a fair carriage of justice.
Nevertheless, the mentally ill offender, whose guilt has
been determined by a less stringent test, finds themselves
committed almost forever, while their ‘normal’ counterpart,
may serve only half their sentence. This is particularly galling
when the state patient has to deal with the early release of
their co-accused while they look forward to a seemingly
endless detention. Commonly state patients are also
aggrieved that they are detained despite not being found
guilty. This has the effect that it usually is not possible to
confront them with their offences as they point out, correctly,
that they were not really found guilty. 
The most surprising aspect of this practice is the lack of
outrage at what seems, on the face of it, to be an abuse of
human rights.
The Problem of Definitions
Many surveys of legal systems in European, Australasian and
North American countries have confirmed that there is a
confusing profusion of legal terms that loosely correspond to
the colloquially named concept of ‘insanity’. These differences
are found even between regions within these countries.2,3
Worse still, no legislation actually defines ‘mental illness’, or
gives any indication which psychiatric disorders would qualify
for the legal definition. For example, Austria allows for a
‘profound impairment of consciousness’, Denmark a ‘state
equal to mental illness’, Finland a ‘state of lunacy’ and so on.3
Every country would allow psychosis, especially if due to
schizophrenia, to be used as a valid insanity defence. But
some allow addiction, neuroses, and personality disorders too.
Our law suffers the same impediments, and to compound
the problem adds ‘mental defect’ as an additional criterion.
The courts have accepted that the definitions of ‘mental
illness’ and ‘mental defect’ can be entrusted to the experts,
who must assess and provide an opinion on the accused,
which is a quaint notion to use in an adversarial system. In our
law the insanity defence is encapsulated within the legal
construct of ‘pathological incapacity’, which implies that such
an accused suffers from a discernable brain disorder that can
be directly determined, and which is amenable to some
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a1An interesting aside: in the Mental Health Care Act those suffering from
psychiatric disorders are called ‘mental health care users’, but those
certified for committing an offence are called ‘state patients’. Somehow
insanity miraculously allows us to medicalise mental disorders.
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treatment.4 Is there a difference between ‘illness’ and
‘defect’? Psychiatrists seem informally to have agreed that
the former refers to psychotic or severe mood disorders,
whereas the latter includes any disorder characterised by
cognitive impairment. Clinically ‘defect’ and ‘illness’ are
generally considered to be synonymous. But it is worrying
that the law insists on the distinction, as cognitive
impairment has a complicated and often reciprocal
association with many serious psychiatric disorders.
This would all be well if psychiatric diagnoses were
reliable and valid. But they are not. Each edition of DSM
changes criteria, adds new disorders, or discards well
used ones.5 Some of these changes have profound
implications, for example there is now a proposal that
early dementia-like symptoms be encapsulated into a new
category called ‘minor cognitive impairment’. This means
that this diagnosis, which previously was not available to
commit an accused, may potentially be used to create
another group of state patients. Worse still, it is well known
that even using the universally well tried DSM diagnoses
psychiatrists will only achieve consensus on a diagnosis in
about 75-80% of the time, and then simultaneously will
produce lists of other co-morbid and differential
diagnoses.6,7 Sometimes, this does result in the unedifying
spectacle of experts offering diametrically opposing
assessments in court (using the same clinical information),
much to the confusion and bemusement of our learned
law colleagues. So, fairness in the use of the insanity
defence already stumbles at another hurdle.
Can psychiatrists really assist in determining
criminal responsibility?
Are people with severe mental illness really not able to
appreciate wrongfulness, or control themselves? From the
legal perspective the more serious the offence the more
important it becomes that the court consider the
offender’s ability to form intent (mens rea). The Law
assumes that every accused has the capacity to form
intent (criminal responsibility), but will allow a defence of
mental illness to negate this.4 Actually in a local study we
found that so-called normal defendants seem to be as
ignorant about the meaning of wrongfulness, were as likely
to report that they could not control themselves (usually as
they were angry), and were as clueless about court
procedures as their mentally ill counterparts.8 Despite
some tantalising findings that seem to show that
psychopathy and damage to some regions of the brain are
associated with problems in moral reasoning
neuroscientists are still not able to demonstrate that
mentally ill individuals are less responsible for their
actions than unaffected people.9
Yet most psychiatrists would insist that the presence of
psychotic symptoms (or cognitive deficits) during an
offence is enough to qualify for a successful insanity
defence. Unfortunately the courts generally accept the
expert’s opinion, where instead they ought to be deciding
on this ultimate issue. My anecdotal experience is that
almost all psychotic defendants can appreciate
wrongfulness, and are able to control themselves. It’s just
that their motivations are crazy, and therefore deemed
excusable. 
Is indefinite hospitalization a just disposal?
The rationale for certifying state patients seems to be based
on two concerns. Firstly, it is not possible to predict how long
it will take to stabilise any psychiatric disorder, or whether
there will be a response at all. Therefore it seems
reasonable not to specify the period a mentally ill person
ought to receive treatment. Secondly there is always anxiety
that people with mental illness are dangerous, and should be
discharged back into the community with extreme caution.
Not surprisingly, when someone with a serious mental
illness commits an offence both of the above issues seem to
coalesce to support the belief that a state patient should
remain certified until he or she is ‘cured’ and no longer
dangerous. Superficially it would seem that evidence from
research justifies this, as it is now generally accepted that
psychosis is associated with a slighter greater risk for
violent behaviour, and of course it is a truism that many
people with psychotic disorders do not respond completely
to treatment. But these are particularly specious arguments.
As a starter the United Nations new Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities specifies that ‘the
existence of a disability shall in no case justify a deprivation
of liberty’, and continues to assert that unlawful detention
would include those cases where the assessment of mental
or intellectual disability are combined with ‘other elements
such as dangerousness, or care and treatment’.1 The UN
High Commissioner for Human Rights has therefore urged
that the insanity defence be abolished as practiced
generally. This may just be a political victory for the anti-
psychiatry lobby, but it should give us pause to consider
whether there is justification for certifying state patients for
indefinite periods.
For the past two decades long stay beds in psychiatric
hospitals have been reduced drastically to deinstitutionalize
chronic psychiatric patients. The underlying assumption is
that people with serious mental illness are better served by
living and being treated in the community. In contrast
forensic mental health units have been expanding steadily
over the corresponding period. Currently in the Western
Cape, South Africa, the forensic mental health service
occupies at least 8 wards in two hospitals, and will probably
continue to expand. The curious irony is that the acute
system is now overwhelmed by admissions of severely
psychotic people, most of whom are admitted because of
disruptive and aggressive behaviour, who are not supposed
to remain in hospital for longer than 2 months (and often
have to be discharged prematurely to create space for more
admissions), whereas the forensic system contains state
patients who are generally clinically stable (and thoroughly
institutionalized) but deemed too risky to be discharged
easily. Add to this the ever increasing influence of the
Recovery Model that rightly emphasises that, given our
inability to achieve idealised treatment endpoints in mental
health, we should strive to optimise our patients’ lives within
the confines of their disabilities. So, already we have both
ideological and practical reasons to limit the periods that
patients spend in hospital and accept the limits of their
capacities.
The second concern that indefinite certification at least
addresses the risk of future violence strikes at the heart of
the largely failed enterprise of risk assessment. Since the
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early 1990’s there has been a profusion of research into
producing actuarial tools that could assign measures of risk
that patients will engage in aggressive or violent behaviour.
Despite the injection of bucket loads of research funding into
this enterprise two major deficiencies persist; regardless of
the tool or scale used the highest accuracy that any can
possibly provide is actually about 75% , and all predictions
are only valid in the short to medium term.10,11 Therefore
there is no objective method that can ascertain whether it will
ever be safe to discharge a state patient into the community,
with the assurance that he will not act aggressively for years
or decades henceforth. Again, the state patient can now shift
his gaze from his ‘normal’ co-accused who wins an early
release from prison to the severely mentally ill patients (many
of whom are more violent than he) who enjoy relatively brief
sojourns in acute psychiatric facilities.
Why is discharge so difficult to achieve?
A judge-in-chambers will generally grant a discharge if the
state patient’s mental state is stable (if not ‘normal’), and if
there are assurances that he will not abuse substances, will
attend a clinic, be compliant with treatment, and will be
supervised by an identified family member for a designated
period. Most state patients derive from deprived
circumstances, live in areas that have poor resources, and
often can only be placed with the very people against whom
their index offence was committed. Many community facilities
are reluctant to provide accommodation and supervision for
people who have been doubly stigmatised by mental illness
and criminality. In the Western Cape only a handful of state
patients really fulfil the requirements for discharge. 
The process for discharge is unwieldy. Applications
(supported by clinical reports) have to be lodged with the
Registrar of the High Court, who then forwards this to the
Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) for a report and
recommendation. The DPP then requests reports from the
treating clinicians (that can include all members of the
multidisciplinary team). These are then forwarded to a judge
in chambers. The system is inefficient, and to date we still
await decisions from applications submitted eons ago.
Proposals
It is unrealistic to expect our legal system to overhaul the
insanity defence completely. But several modifications could
be debated and implemented:
1. The finding under section 78 of the Criminal Procedure
Act should be changed to a ‘guilty but insane’ verdict.
This will enable the court to issue an order that could
initially limit the period that a state patient would remain
certified. The court could either impose mandatory
periods, which could compare to those that may have
been imposed for a comparable conviction, or every
state patient could be certified for an initial period, for
example, 2 years.
2. At the end of the court ordered period of certification the
state patient would automatically be discharged (as a
prisoner would be released at the end of a sentence),
unless the treating clinicians motivate for a further
designated period of certification.
3. If an accused is only certified, under section 77 of the
Criminal Procedure Act, in other words is unfit to stand
trial, then the court should set a date when the accused
will be returned to court for continuation of the trial, unless
the treating clinicians provide a report that the state
patient remains unfit to stand trial.
4. The discharge of forensic patients ought to be simplified.
It may be more appropriate that discharge applications be
submitted to the Mental Health Review Boards that
perhaps, anyway, should have more responsibilities in the
care and administration of forensic patients. 
Conclusion
The application of the insanity defence has resulted in a
burgeoning population of institutionalised patients, whose
care and rehabilitation increasingly is at odds with the
prevailing philosophies of mental health care. I am not
proposing wholesale changes to the Law, but have suggested
that important modifications be considered. The advantages
of these changes would include being able to deal
therapeutically with state patients, in that they would probably
be more willing to deal with the implications of their offences,
psychiatric impairments, and be able to foresee their own
reintegration into the community. But most important of all, we
would be able to offer them a very precious therapeutic
commodity called hope.
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